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Abstract: The world, as a unifying nexus of sig-
nificance, is inherently precarious and constitu-
tively destined toward its own unraveling. Our 
fascination with a future end of the world masks 
our realization that the world as common and 
unified totality is already disintegrating. What re-
mains after the end of the world is also what pre-
cedes it, the geomaterial elements, which condi-
tion the world without being reducible to things 
within it. Through our participation in elemental 
materiality, we encounter the abyssal vertigo of 
deep time as an anachronistic rupture of lived 
and historical time. The geological memory of 
stone situates it at the threshold of world and 
non-world, while our liability to an immemorial 
prehistory situates us at the intersection of in-
commensurable durations, those of the ancestral 
past as well as the apocalyptic future. 
 Resumen: El mundo, como un nexo de signi-
ficado unificador, es intrínsecamente precario y 
está constitutivamente destinado a su propio 
desenredo. Nuestra fascinación por un futuro 
final del mundo enmascara nuestra compren-
sión de que el mundo como totalidad común y 
unificada ya se está desintegrando. Lo que queda 
después del fin del mundo es también lo que lo 
precede, los elementos geomateriales, que con-
dicionan el mundo sin ser reducibles a las cosas 
dentro de él. A través de nuestra participación en 
la materialidad elemental, nos encontramos con 
el vértigo abismal del tiempo profundo como una 
ruptura anacrónica del tiempo vivido e histórico. 
La memoria geológica de la piedra lo sitúa en el 
umbral del mundo y del no mundo, mientras que 
nuestra responsabilidad ante una prehistoria 
inmemorial nos sitúa en la intersección de dura-
ciones inconmensurables, tanto del pasado an-
cestral como del futuro apocalíptico. 
Keywords: World. Apocalypse. Elements. 
Stone. Geology. Speculative. Realism. Decons-
truction. Ancestrality. Memory. Husserl. Heideg-
ger. Merleau-Ponty. Derrida. Nancy. Meillassoux. 
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Allow me to begin with a few words of gratitude, first to the Directors of the 
Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology for their invitation to deliver 
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the Aron Gurwitsch Memorial Lecture, which is now in its 35th year1. I have also 
long felt a particular gratitude to Aron Gurwitsch himself. As someone who first 
discovered phenomenology through Merleau-Ponty, I appreciate the influence of 
Gurwitsch’s thought and teachings on Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical formation, 
even if Merleau-Ponty himself rarely acknowledged this debt. While reading 
Phenomenology of Perception in 1947, Gurwitsch wrote to Alfred Schutz of his 
pleasure at recognizing so much from his lectures in Merleau-Ponty’s excellent 
book, of being in a sense its “godfather”, but also of his disappointment that he 
would not have such an influence in the United States, where everything that he 
does goes, as he puts it, “into the void” (Grathoff 1989, 93). Of course, nothing 
could be further from the truth, since Gurwitsch’s subsequent students at the 
New School have played a decisive role in the dissemination of phenomenology 
in the United States, which is the second reason for my gratitude to him. One of 
those students, Lester Embree, was my mentor during a postdoctoral fellowship 
exactly twenty years ago, in 1996, and at the end of my time working with him, 
he presented me with the gift of a stately desk that Gurwitsch had given to him 
during his student years, and that Gurwitsch had in turn received from his mentor 
Kurt Goldstein. I still treasure this desk, my “phenomenology desk”, and I like to 
think of its well-worn surface as imprinted with the memories of these inspiring 
thinkers. 
Nevertheless, I cannot shake the feeling that my gratitude is tinged with an 
inescapable element of ingratitude, given how little my philosophical approach 
has in common with Gurwitsch’s own, and in this regrettable sense my 
“memorial” lecture is not genuinely true to his memory. Husserl once told 
Gurwitsch that they were both “destined to work at the foundations”. I have tried 
in my own fashion to do just this, while acknowledging that what this means for 
me will have been something quite different than it meant to Gurwitsch himself. 
The foundations that I will begin from today are the limits of the world, time, and 




1 This essay was delivered as the 2016 Aron Gurwitsch Memorial Lecture at the Society for Phenom-
enology and Existential Philosophy, Salt Lake City, 21 October 2016. 
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INTRODUCTION: WHAT COMES AFTER THE WORLD? 
Phenomenology’s most significant legacy may well be its thematization of the 
world as a philosophical problem, which has taught us to understand the world 
not merely as a given totality of entities or events ─our planet, for example, or 
the universe more broadly─ but rather as the non-thematic referential or 
horizonal structure that the appearance of anything whatsoever presupposes. 
Phenomenology therefore opens a path for describing the world that is distinct 
from either the Kantian treatment of it as an a priori form correlated with 
consciousness or the speculative metaphysical effort to account for the world in 
terms of another being or another world ─both of which fall back on an 
explanation of the world in worldly terms, by way of what the world alone makes 
possible. This is why Eugen Fink, in his famous 1933 Kanstudien article, describes 
phenomenology’s task as the effort to uncover “the origin of the world”, an origin 
that could neither be anything within the world, outside of the world, nor in 
another world (1933, 38/1970, 95). According to Fink, this strange logic of the 
origin is the key to phenomenology’s distinctive understanding of the transcen-
dental, although it also leads to a series of well-known paradoxes that concern 
how this logic can be communicated or understood in relation to that of worldly 
beings. Jacques Derrida’s early work takes its inspiration from these paradoxes, 
as Leonard Lawlor has shown, so that deconstruction may also be understood as 
a radicalization of the problem of world and its genesis2. 
We will return to the question of the origin of the world, but first let us 
consider instead the end of the world and, more precisely, what comes after it. 
In an essay on “World as Horizon” drafted a few months after the horrific events 
of September 11th, Donn Welton explains the phenomenological sense of world 
─which he describes as a “nexus of significance” distinct from “something like a 
natural environment or a socio-historical reality or the totality or whole of all such 
worlds”─ with reference to the collapse of the Twin Towers of the World Trade 
Center (Welton 2003, 223f). He describes the initial shock caused by the news 
of the first plane hitting the tower as an example of “dissonance” ─a recalcitrant 
and inexplicable event, though one still occurring against the background of a 
stable and familiar world, still teleologically oriented toward unity and integration. 
 
2 See Lawlor 2002, especially Chapter One, “Genesis as the Basic Problem of Phenomenology”. 
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With images of the second plane being crashed intentionally, dissonance 
gradually gives way to disintegration, so that, in his words, “With the collapse of 
the second tower the world itself literally flies apart” (ib. 225). As his essay 
concludes, “it was not a particular fact or a string of facts within the world, but 
the world itself, the very context and background of our everyday life, that came 
unraveled on September 11” (ib. 231). 
Welton illustrates the horizonal character of the world, as a stable and pre-
given nexus teleologically oriented toward unity and harmony, precisely by 
calling attention to its fragility, its vulnerability to collapse. The world is not 
guaranteed; it can and does end. Now, we can distinguish, at least formally, 
between the disintegration of world as a nexus of significance and its material 
dissolution, that it, the factual destruction of concrete, plaster, glass, paper, 
furniture, electronics, and human bodies. The world as such does not consist of 
things and events, but it holds them together, gives them significance, unity, 
place, duration. When a tool breaks down within the world, Heidegger’s famous 
hammer, the momentary dissonance remains bound within the web of the whole. 
But when the web itself unravels, does everything material simply vanish? 
Hardly. We then find ourselves instead awash in the detritus of world, in piles of 
rubble, decomposing bodies, clouds of dust. Welton does not mention the cloud 
of toxic dust that blacked out the sun, a cloud visible from the International Space 
Station, which gradually settled into a three-inch deep layer of fine powder 
covering every surface for blocks. Despite the singular ecceity of this dust, it 
cannot but remind us of the miles of cinders that replaced Hiroshima in 1945, or 
the tons of mud that choked New Orleans in 2005. Dust, cinders, and mud are 
what is left of the very materiality of the world after the end of the world; they 
are world’s body dissolved, disintegrated, no longer harmonious or unified, no 
longer forming a whole, a background, a context. After the world, we are 
confronted by the geomaterial elements, that from which the world is formed and 
to which it ultimately returns. 
Here, I will try to approach this relationship between world and the elements 
that precede and exceed it from a few different directions, hoping to catch a 
better glimpse of it by considering, first, in what sense the world is coming to an 
end, or has perhaps already ended; second, what it means to be “worldless”, like 
a stone; and, third, how this worldlessness makes possible our exposure to deep 
time, both past and future. In the first section, then, I follow some clues about 
      THE END OF ALL THINGS: GEOMATERIALITY AND DEEP TIME 
FICHTE Y HUSSERL … 






Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico, 7, 2018  
the “end of the world” from Husserl through Levinas and Derrida. These point 
toward the conclusion that world in the phenomenological sense has its own 
dissolution as its ultimate condition and horizon; that world has its outside on 
the inside, so to speak. The second section then considers our situation of 
worldlessness in relation to that attributed by Heidegger to the stone. Here, we 
borrow some critical insights from Jean-Luc Nancy, namely, that there is no “the” 
stone, no stone in general or as such, and that even if a stone does not “have” a 
world, it nevertheless may be said to “be” a world, as both the “effective 
exteriority” of other bodies and the areal spacing that grants the world its there. 
In the third and last section, we turn our attention from the spacing of stones to 
their memory, that is, to their role in crossing thresholds of world and time. Here 
I consider the abyssal character of the experience of geological time and respond 
to Quentin Meillassoux’s rejection of any phenomenological account of 
“ancestrality”, the time prior to consciousness or life. Against Meillassoux, I argue 
that the vertiginous encounter with the deep past and future has its source in the 
impersonal worldlessness of the elements, which disrupts any correlation 
between self and world. The timeless memory of stone situates it both within the 
world and beyond it, at the threshold of world and non-world, and our liability to 
this minerality situates us at the intersections of incommensurable durations, 
those of the ancestral past as well as the apocalyptic future.   
1. HAS THE WORLD ALREADY ENDED? 
Welton’s description of the events of 9/11 as the “end of the world” reminds 
us that, alongside phenomenology’s interest in the origin of the world, it has also 
been invested from the beginning in a certain vision of the end of the world. I 
have in mind, of course, Husserl’s famous thought-experiment of world 
annihilation in paragraph 49 of Ideas I. Husserl introduces this thought-
experiment as the final and decisive step toward the phenomenological epochē, 
intended to purify consciousness of the general thesis of the world. Here he 
describes the “quite conceivable” possibility that our experiences might be so 
irresolvably conflictual that they “dissolve into illusion”, and not “just for us but 
in themselves” (Husserl 1976, 103/ 1982, 109). Rather than every illusion or 
conflict resolving itself by pointing toward a greater truth in a more-inclusive 
whole, experience could imaginably reveal itself to be, in Husserl’s words, 
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“refractory to the demand that it carry on its positings of physical things 
harmoniously, that its context might lose its fixed regular organizations of 
adumbrations, apprehensions, and appearances ─in short, that there might no 
longer be any world” (1976, 103/1982, 109). In this imaginable ─though, for 
Husserl, obviously counter-factual─ scenario, the world would be reduced to 
more-or-less complete chaos. It might, nevertheless, as he points out, still be 
haunted by the specters of things, in the form of crude and transient “unity-
formations” that lack the endurance and stability to cohere into genuine physical 
things in themselves (1976, 103f/1982, 110). This is the debris of the world, the 
dust of things, neither quite a physical object nor simply nothing at all. 
At first glance, Welton’s example ─although he refers to it as the “end of the 
world”─ is not comparable with the world-annihilation described by Husserl. At 
best, this was the end of “a” world, a disintegration of world localized in space 
and time, not the end of “the” world. The dust that once blocked out the sun has 
been subjected to analysis by toxicologists, and whether it was the cause of 
higher cancer rates among first responders is an ongoing topic of legal debates. 
Even if we might grant that the world as-a-whole looks different to us now, that 
the world has been irreversibly transformed by this event, the one world as such 
retains its integrity. But things are not so simple, since we must also ask for 
whom? If the world has been reconstituted, reintegrated, cleaned up and put 
back to work, this is so only for the survivors. And how to separate survivors 
from victims, those whose worlds recovered from those whose worlds remained 
in tatters, is not obvious if we consider the sufferers of Post-Traumatic Stress, 
those who continue to mourn lost loved ones, or those who have subsequently 
perished from exposure to toxic dust. At a phenomenological level, this raises 
the question of how much irresolvable conflict, how much illusion, the world can 
tolerate and still be called “the” world, still hang together as a whole from which 
we can expect a teleological progression toward the truth. Is there, after all, only 
one decisive end of the world, or might it slowly unravel or even end repeatedly, 
perhaps even constitutively?  
Let us consider two responses to Husserl’s thought experiment that address 
these questions, the first from Levinas and the second from Derrida, with an eye 
toward what they might teach us about what comes after the world. Writing in 
1984, at the height of the second Cold War, Levinas offers the following 
reflections on Husserl’s thought-experiment: “[D]oubtless, the seventy years 
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which separate us from Husserl’s text ─two world wars, totalitarianisms of the 
right and left, massacres, genocides, and the Holocaust─ have already signified 
(if one can still speak meaningfully) an experience torn to shreds, one impossible 
to put back together” (Levinas 1990, 12). For Levinas, “our epoch” is 
characterized by the fact that Husserl’s “epistemic reflection”–carried out, as it 
was, before the outbreak of World War I, and therefore at a time when it might 
not have been possible concretely to imagine the world “invert[ing] itself into a 
non-world”–has subsequently taken on an “apocalyptic sense”. He names here, 
in particular, “the nuclear menace which weighs upon our planet, the explosion 
or universal conflagration that humanity stands in fear of tomorrow”, which would 
be, in his view, the literal enactment of what Husserl had imagined (ib. 12f). 
World as an intelligible whole, as an object for our self-conscious contemplation 
and technological manipulation, has therefore long been unraveling and now 
teeters on the brink of its inversion into a non-world populated by non-things. 
Furthermore, on Levinas’s view, this apocalyptic situation is inseparable from 
modernity’s drive toward mastery of the world, from its attempt to grasp all 
otherness as a unified whole under the “universal gaze of knowledge”. The futile 
effort of the transcendental “I think” to “reassemble the fantastic images of the 
real into a world” are therefore less a philosophical failure than a “cosmic 
catastrophe”. In short, apocalyptic destruction is the very culmination of the 
phenomenological conception of the world, insofar as this is bound up with the 
modernist techno-scientific agenda through its privileging of transcendental 
subjectivity. 
Alongside this response from Levinas, consider Derrida’s claim, made repea-
tedly in his later work, that each and every death of a unique living thing is the 
end of the world, absolutely and infinitely, and not merely the end of a world or 
of a living thing within the world. Derrida makes this point forcefully in his essay 
“Rams”, where it introduces his reading of Celan’s poem “Vast, Glowing Vault”, 
and especially its final line: Die Welt ist fort, ich muß dich tragen, “The world is 
gone, I must carry you”. As Derrida writes: 
For each time, and each time singularly, each time irreplaceably, each time infinitely, 
death is nothing less than an end of the world. Not only one end among others, the 
end of someone or of something in the world, the end of a life or of a living being. 
Death puts an end neither to someone in the world nor to one world among others. 
Death marks each time, each time in defiance of arithmetic, the absolute end of the 
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one and only world, of that which each opens as a one and only world, the end of the 
unique world, the end of the totality of what is or can be presented as the origin of 
the world for any unique living being, be it human or not. (Derrida 2003, 23/2005, 
140) 
Derrida’s insistence here that every death–and he is explicit elsewhere that 
this should extend even to insects, protozoa, and plants3–is the “absolute end of 
the one and only world” is intended to respect the incommensurability and 
inappropriability of the other as a singular origin of existence, with a unique and 
untranslatable exposure to experience and time, a respect that Derrida finds 
already implied by Husserl’s recognition that the other can be presented only 
through analogical appresentation rather than direct perception.  
Furthermore, as Derrida makes explicit in the closing pages of his essay, this 
way of understanding the end of the world is intended precisely as a way of 
pushing to its limit Husserl’s own thought-experiment of world-annihilation in 
paragraph 49 of Ideas I. “Isn’t this retreat of the world”, Derrida asks, “the most 
necessary, the most logical, but also the most insane experience of a 
transcendental phenomenology?” (2003, 74/2005, 160). As Derrida notes, 
Husserl’s hypothesis “does not threaten, by right and in its meaning, the sphere 
of phenomenological and pure egological experience. On the contrary, it would 
open access to this sphere”, and, on his reading, Celan’s poem “repeats without 
weakening this phenomenological radicalization. It pushes to the limit this 
experience of the possible annihilation of the world and of what remains of the 
world or still survives it, to wit, its sense ‘for me,’ for a pure ego” (2003, 75/2005, 
161). This is a first step, then: The world is gone. “No world can any longer 
support us, serve as mediation, as ground, as earth, as foundation or as alibi” 
(2003, 68/2005, 158). But this brings us, in a second step, to what Derrida calls 
the most “worrisome test” of Husserlian phenomenology, which is that –once the 
world is gone, once we find ourselves in the “absolute solitude of the pure ego”– 
then “the alter ego that is constituted in the ego is no longer accessible in an 
originary and purely phenomenological intution”, but is instead “constituted only 
 
3 This is most explicit in the January 10, 2001 session from Derrida’s death penalty seminar, where 
he writes that “the death one makes or lets come in this way is not the end of this or that, this or that 
individual, the end of a who or a what in the world. Each time something dies, it’s the end of the world. 
Not the end of a world, but of the world, of the whole of the world, of the infinite opening of the world. 
And this is the case for no matter what living being, from the tree to the protozoa, from the mosquito to 
the human, death is infinite, it is the end of the infinite. The finitude of the infinite” (Derrida 2015, 118f; 
quoted in Naas 2015, p. 181 n14, who provides this translation). 
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by analogy, by appresentation, indirectly, inside of me” (2003, 76/2005, 161). I 
must carry you, but precisely in the most paradoxical sense, where “to carry” no 
longer means “to include, to comprehend in the self, but rather to carry oneself 
or bear oneself toward the infinite inappropriability of the other, toward the 
absolute transcendence in the very inside of me, that is to say, in me outside of 
me” (2003, 76/2005, 161). The infinite distance that the other’s transcendence 
opens within my world announces my responsibility to carry the other’s world 
within me, to mourn it, after the other’s death–but also the melancholic 
impossibility of my doing so, precisely since I can never contain or encompass 
this unique and singular opening onto the world. And this ethical moment, the 
paradoxical responsibility to carry the other, requires the withdrawal of the world, 
in the sense of any common ground or foundation that might serve to mediate 
between us. The survivor is left “in some fashion beyond or before the world itself 
[…] responsible without world (weltlos), without the ground of any world, 
thenceforth, in a world without world, as if without earth beyond the end of the 
world” (2003, 23/2005, 140).  
Now, although Derrida begins from the death of the other, the end of the 
world as he is describing it does not, strictly speaking, await an actual death. 
This is because each and every encounter with each and every living thing already 
announces the heart of absence or transcendence interrupting and constituting 
my world, calling me to respond with a mourning both ineluctable and insuf-
ficient. The end of the world therefore haunts every world from within, contesting 
its pretense of being “one and only”, “unique”, or an all-encompassing horizon. 
If the end of the world is already implicated within and even constitutive of the 
world itself, then the world is not a self-enclosed totality that maintains itself until 
interrupted from the outside, but rather has its outside on the inside. 
Derrida returns to this investigation of the end of the world and radicalizes it 
further in the second year of his final seminar, The Beast and the Sovereign, this 
time in dialogue with Heidegger’s famous three theses on world from 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics–the stone is worldless (weltlos), the 
animal is poor in world (weltarm), and man is world-forming (weltbildend)4. 
Derrida frames the year’s seminar in the first lecture with three theses of his 
own, three thesis that are apparently incompatible with each other, briefly 
 
4 See Heidegger 1992: 272ff; 1995: 184ff. 
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summarized as follows: (1) animals and humans incontestably inhabit the same 
“objective” world, even if they do not have the same experience of “objectivity”; 
(2) animals and humans incontestably do not inhabit the same world, since the 
human world is not identical with that of non-human animals; and (3) no two 
individuals, whether human or animal, inhabit the same world, and the differen-
ces between their worlds are essentially unbridgeable. This third thesis follows 
from the fact that “the community of the world is always constructed, simulated 
by a set of stabilizing apparatuses, more or less stable, then, and never natural, 
language in the broad sense, codes of traces being designed, among all living 
beings, to construct a unity of the world that is always deconstructible, nowhere 
and never given in nature” (2010, 31/2011, 8f). Between my world (which, for 
me, can only be the unique and only world, encompassing all others) and the 
world of any other, therefore, “there is first the space and the time of an infinite 
difference, an interruption that is incommensurable with all attempts to make a 
passage, a bridge, an isthmus, all attempts at communication, translation, trope, 
and transfer that the desire for a world or the want of a world, the being wanting 
a world will try to pose, impose, propose, stabilize. There is no world, there are 
only islands” (2010, 31/2011, 9). 
Derrida returns to the first and third of these theses in the tenth and final 
session of the seminar, where he again emphasizes, developing the third claim, 
that the unity of the world is a merely presumptive construction, a means of 
reassuring ourselves in the face of the absence of the world. Here, the end of the 
world–again associated with the line from Celan, “Die Welt ist fort”–does not 
await the death of the other but is instead “the ever unsewn and torn tissue of 
our most constant and quotidian experience”, something that we know “with an 
undeniable and stubborn, i.e., permanently denied, knowledge” (2010, 
367/2011, 266). The presumptive unity of the word “world”, then, is intended to  
mask our panic […], to protect us against the infantile but infinite anxiety of the fact 
that there is not the world, that nothing is less certain than the world itself, that there 
is perhaps no longer a world and no doubt there never was one as totality of anything 
at all […] and that radical dissemination, i.e. the absence of a common world, the 
irremediable solitude without salvation of the living being, depends first on the 
absence without recourse of any world, i.e. of any common meaning of the word 
“world”, in sum of any common meaning at all. (Derrida 2010, 366/2011, 265f) 
Here, we have moved from treating the end of the world as a phantasm to 
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recognizing that the phantasm is actually the world itself, that the phantasm of 
the world is intended to mask the absence of any common world. Our anxieties 
about the end of the world, insofar as they present the world as fragile and 
vulnerable, precisely reinforce our belief in its reality. In this situation, according 
to Derrida, I must carry you can mean one of only two things: either that, with 
both of us sharing this knowledge that the world is no longer, I must carry you 
into the worldless void; or, that what I must do, “with you and carrying you, is 
make it that there be precisely a world, just a world, if not a just world, or to do 
things so as to make as if there were just a world, and to make the world come 
to the world...” (2010, 369/2011, 268). On Michael Naas’s reading, Derrida 
places his hope in the second option, which Naas describes as a poetic making 
or remaking of the world ex nihilo in full recognition that there is no world: “Aware 
of its own powerlessness, undone by its own ability, this poiesis would be a 
making as if that leaves within the world a trace of the end or loss of the world” 
(Naas 2015, 60). Without a poetic making or remaking of the world, a making of 
the world with and for the other, we remain weltlos, worldless, like the stone. 
Nevertheless, Derrida's final seminar suggests another reconstructive path 
for understanding the world, namely, in the first of the three theses introduced 
in the first session: “animals and humans inhabit the same world, the same 
objective world” (2010, 31/2011, 8); as living beings, they share in common “the 
finitude of their life, and therefore, among other features of finitude, their 
mortality in the place they inhabit, whether one calls that place world or earth 
(earth including sky and sea) and these places that they inhabit in common […]” 
(2010, 33/2011, 10). When Derrida returns to this common sense of world in the 
final session, he again stresses that it is the same space of inhabitation or co-
habitation, a common habitat, characterized precisely in terms of the elements: 
“water, earth, air, fire” (2010, 363/2011, 263). Now, this returns us the problem 
of the elements and their ambivalent relationship with world. We have seen how 
the elements are left behind with the world’s dissolution, such that the 
disintegration of our buildings and tools into dust figures the world’s absolute 
reference to its finitude, its liability to the arche-materiality that grants its 
endurance and holds its horizons open. If the world has its outside on the inside, 
if it bears an essential reference to its own dissolution as its fundamental 
condition and ultimate horizon, then this liability is figured in its paradoxical 
relation to the elements, as neither precisely things within the world nor wholly 
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outside it. Derrida’s remarks here suggest that the elements, while remaining 
liminal to world in the phenomenological sense, nevertheless open a space and 
time that traverses all worlds. 
2. TOUCHSTONES 
Derrida notes at several points that the departure of the world, Die Welt ist 
fort, exceeds and disrupts Heidegger’s three thesis on world, that its irreducibility 
to the categories of weltlos, weltarm, and weltbildend requires us to rethink the 
very thought of world (2003, 79/2005, 163; cf. Derrida 2010, 159, 243/2011, 
104, 169). Nevertheless, even if our situation of carrying the other is irreducible 
to either of these categories, Derrida repeatedly describes it using Heidegger’s 
category for the worldless stone, “We are weltlos” (2010, 31f/2011, 9)5. Of 
course, we are “clearly not” worldless in the same manner as Heidegger had 
attributed this to the stone, as Derrida says explicitly (2010, 32/2011, 9), but 
then how are we to think this strange lithic proximity? Recall that, for Heidegger, 
the stone is “absolutely indifferent” insofar as it remains entirely outside or before 
the difference between being indifferent or not indifferent to its own being 
(Derrida 1987, 39ff/1989, 20f); it is neither awake nor asleep (Derrida 2006, 
203/2008, 148); it cannot be deprived of world since it has absolutely no 
relationship with other entities, no experience of the sun that shines upon it or 
the lizard that rests atop it (Derrida 1987, 79ff/1989, 51f; cf. Derrida 2006, 
213/2008, 155f). Furthermore, and for Heidegger this is the Prüfstein, the 
touchstone (Derrida 2010, 115/2011, 173), the stone “does not die, because it 
does not live” (2010, 171/2011, 113; cf. Derrida 2006, 211/2008, 154); it is 
finite while lacking finitude (2006, 206/2008, 150), and therefore entirely outside 
of the relation between life and death, of mortality or lifedeath.  
Derrida calls attention to the fact that, in Heidegger’s theses on world, the 
stone stands in as the sole example of “material things”, of the “lifeless” or the 
“inanimate”. As Derrida asks “Why does he take [this] example of an inanimate 
thing, why a stone and not a plank or a piece of iron, or water or fire?” (2010, 
27f/2011, 6; cf. Derrida 2006, 209/2008, 153). By privileging “the” stone as 
exemplary of the material thing, Heidegger participates in what Jeffrey Cohen 
 
5 See also Derrida 2003: 23/2005: 140; 2010: 253/2011: 177.  
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calls “a long tradition of mining the philosophical from the lithic”, which poses the 
question of what stone’s ontological exemplariness reveals as well as conceals 
(Cohen 2005, 4). For Derrida, the choice of the stone as exemplar serves to cover 
over the ambiguities of the concept of life, which become obvious when one 
considers where to locate plants, for example ─or cadavers─ in relation to the 
general categories of “life” or “material things” (2010, 28/2011, 6). But in 
attending here only to the complications of any pure distinction between what is 
inside or outside of lifedeath, Derrida never addresses–as he does so well with 
the general category of “the” animal–the fact there can be no the stone, no 
general category of “stone”. This is so, first of all, because there is no “the” 
material thing, no material thing in general, but only a plurality of material 
singularities. As Jean-Luc Nancy puts this point, matter is “always singular or 
singularized” (1993, 97/1997, 58), the very difference and différance “through 
which something is possible, as thing and as some” (1993, 95/1997, 57). 
Furthermore, there is no stone in general or as such, but rather pebbles, stones, 
rocks of unimaginably diverse sorts, sizes, and placements, each one singularly 
unique. And even if Heidegger is correct to insist that no stone “has” a world, 
each singularly unique stone may nevertheless constitute a manner of being-
toward, of l’être-à, that, according to Nancy, qualifies it as a world. As Nancy 
writes: “To be sure, the concrete stone does not ‘have’ a world […] but it is 
nonetheless toward or in the world [au monde] in a mode of toward or in that is 
at least that of areality: extension of the area, spacing, distance, ‘atomistic’ 
constitution. Let us say not that it is ‘toward’ or ‘in’ the world, but that it is world” 
(1993, 103/1997, 62, cf. 1993, 48/1997, 28). The originary spacing of every 
stone, as a world of its own, would therefore be what Nancy calls the “effective 
exteriority” of all else that exists. In response to Heidegger’s three theses on 
world, Nancy writes: “These statements do not do justice, at least, to this: that 
the world beyond humanity ─animals, plants, and stones, oceans, atmospheres, 
sidereal spaces and bodies─ is quite a bit more than the phenomenal correlative 
of a human taking-in-hand, taking-into-account, or taking-care-of: it is the 
effective exteriority without which the very disposition of or to sense would not 
make […] any sense” (1993, 92/1997, 55f). The stone is both a part of the world 
and also, as its effective exteriority, constitutive of the there, the spacing and 
material singularity, of the world. While Nancy is no doubt correct to emphasize 
each and every stone’s spacing and singularity, what truly distinguishes each 
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stone and accounts for its liminal relationship with world is its peculiar 
relationship with time, especially geological or “deep” time, both past and future.  
3. GEOLOGICAL MEMORY 
In a posthumous 1805 biographical sketch of James Hutton, often referred 
to as the founder of modern geology, his friend John Playfair recounts their 1788 
trip to Siccar Point, on the east coast of Scotland, to view a geological formation 
that has since become known as Hutton’s Unconformity (Playfair 1822, 71ff). At 
this site, erosion had made clearly visible the juxtaposition of horizontal strata of 
red limestone with underlying nearly vertical columns of greywacke. The 
scientists’ interest with this formation was due to what it implied about the 
incredible expanse of time required for its generation, the patiently slow and 
sequential accumulation of each layer of rock compounded by the folding over of 
older millennia of deposited strata into their own perpendicular layer below. For 
Hutton, this scene provided incontrovertible evidence of his theory of unifor-
mitarianism, according to which the geological past must be explained by the 
same gradual processes of sedimentation and erosion operating today, leading 
him to propose a concept of geological time with “no vestige of a beginning, ─no 
prospect of an end” (Hutton 1788, 304). Nowadays, geologists studying Hutton’s 
Unconformity date the lower layer of Silurian greywacke at around 435 million 
years old, and the upper layer of Devonian sandstone at 370 million years, with 
the seam of the unconformity marking a 65 million-year hiatus of “missing” time. 
Certainly these numbers astound none of us today in the way that they did 
Hutton’s contemporaries; we are all perfectly familiar with the general concept, 
if not the particulars, of the geological timescale and with linear representations 
of the age of the earth that indicate the emergence of Homo sapiens at the 
fractional tail-end of a long temporal comet. But can we truly say, even today 
and with our extensive theoretical knowledge of geological time, that we 
comprehend the scales of time involved? 
 Hutton’s Unconformity is to geologists what the Galapagos Islands are to 
biologists, and references to it rarely miss the opportunity to mention Playfair’s 
famous retrospective account of his trip with Hutton, with its invocation of the 
temporal sublime:  
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We felt ourselves necessarily carried back to the time when the schistus on which we 
stood was yet at the bottom of the sea, and when the sandstone before us was only 
beginning to be deposited, in the shape of sand or mud, from the waters of a 
superincumbent ocean. An epocha still more remote presented itself, when even the 
most ancient of these rocks, instead of standing upright in vertical beds, lay in 
horizontal planes at the bottom of the sea, and was not yet disturbed by that 
immeasurable force which has burst asunder the solid pavement of the globe. 
Revolutions still more remote appeared in the distance of this extraordinary 
perspective. The mind seemed to grow giddy by looking so far into the abyss of time; 
and while we listened with earnestness and admiration to the philosopher who was 
now unfolding to us the order and series of these wonderful events, we became 
sensible how much farther reason may sometimes go than imagination can venture 
to follow. (Playfair 1822, 80f) 
While geological theories since Hutton’s time have undergone the same 
tumultuous upheavals that he ascribed to this ancient sea bed, the abyssal and 
vertiginous experience of geological time remains contemporary. The ground 
beneath our feet is scarcely reassuring as we try to wrap our minds around the 
breakup and reassembly of the earth’s continents, the cornucopia of long-
vanished species that flourished in worlds we can scarcely reconstruct, or the 
billions of years that light has traveled from distant galaxies to reach our eyes. 
This is not just meganumerophobia, a fear of very large numbers; we encounter 
the abyssal unfathomability of time affectively and viscerally, in our heart of 
hearts, like a wedge driven through our lived experience of daily rhythms, our 
personal memories and anticipations, and the historical fabric of cultural events. 
Indeed, the very “depth” of geological time is the bottomless free-fall into which 
it throws all markers and touchstones by which we orient ourselves within the 
temporal horizons of our world.  
For Hutton, there was no prospect of a beginning to geological processes, but 
today we rely on radiometric dating, based on the constant rate of decay of trace 
radioactive elements, to estimate the Earth’s age at around 4.5 billion years. The 
samples used for such dating are paradigmatic of what Quentin Meillassoux, in 
After Finitude, has termed “arche-fossils”, material traces of an “ancestral” reality 
or event “anterior to the emergence of the human species ─or even anterior to 
every recognized form of life on earth” (2006, 25f/2008, 10). According to 
Meillassoux, the literal truth of empirical claims about such an ancestral reality 
cannot be admitted by post-Kantian “correlationism”, the dominant ideology 
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according to which thinking and being may only be understood in their correlation 
and never independently of each other. For the correlationist–and Meillassoux 
seems to have phenomenologists primarily in mind–statements about such an 
ancestral time, a time prior to all manifestation, are strictly meaningless. But this 
leaves us, Meillassoux argues, with a “strange feeling of imprisonment or 
enclosure”, insofar as the only exteriority that we can encounter remains relative 
to thought (2006, 21/2008, 7). And so, what correlationism has lost, and what 
Meillassoux’s speculative materialism claims to recover, is, in his words, “the 
great outdoors, the absolute outside of pre-critical thinkers: that outside which 
was not relative to us, and which was given as indifferent to its own givenness 
to be what it is, existing in itself regardless of whether we are thinking of it or 
not” (2006, 21f/2008, 7). This absolute Outside would no longer be the correlate 
of any subject; in its absolute indifference to subjectivity, it would no longer 
reflect back to us our own involvement and inherence in the world. 
Now, although Meillassoux does not present his view in these terms, he is 
clearly concerned with the end of the world, at least of the world as we know it. 
This is why he begins his argument with the “ancestral”, with reality “anterior to 
every recognized form of life on earth” (2006, 25f/2008, 10) and later pairs this 
with “possible events that are ulterior to the extinction of the human species” 
(2006, 155/2008, 112), such as would be entailed, he says, by “hypotheses 
about the climactic and geological consequences of a meteor impact 
extinguishing all life on earth” (2006, 155f/2008, 112). The Outside, for 
Meillassoux, always has the air of apocalypse. This is the case despite the fact 
that the absolute Outside is not only anterior or ulterior to our world, but also 
absolutely exterior to us in the present, as a kind of mathematical dopplegänger 
of our world defined by its radical indifference to human existence (2006, 
160/2008, 116). Beyond the horizons of our world, as its Great Outside, this 
“world without us” presumably does not touch on our lived world in any way other 
than to haunt it from the fringes. 
Just as Meillassoux trades on our everyday notion of world, so he fails to 
thematize the problem of time, which for him seems to be reducible to a formula 
for designating the properties of an event, much as it would be, in his example, 
for a scientist using thermoluminescence to date the light emitted by stars. What 
requires explanation, on his account, is the truth of such scientific conclusions 
about the “date” of pre-human events, or the “age” of the universe, and such 
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dates are designated by numbers on a line (2006, 24/2008, 9). Furthermore, the 
problem of how to understand these numbers and this line first confronts us only 
in the era of modern science, since for him the ancestral past is a past that we 
come to know primarily or exclusively through scientific investigation (2006, 
39/2008, 28). But clearly scientific research makes no claim to explain what is 
meant by “past”, nor can it do so, since it takes for granted our lived, pre-
scientific experience of time (Merleau-Ponty 2003a, 171f/2010, 128). If the 
geological scale of time means anything more to us than numbers on a line, this 
is because our experience opens us to a past, and even to an incomprehensibly 
ancient prehistory. It does so because, as Merleau-Ponty emphasizes in his 
reading of Whitehead, we are ourselves embedded, mind and body, within the 
temporal passage of nature; its pulsation runs across us (Merleau-Ponty 1995, 
159ff/2003b, 117ff). And this pulsation transcends the past-present distinction 
in such a way that past and present are enveloping-enveloped, Ineinander, each 
moment entering into relations of exchange and identification, interference and 
confusion, with all the others (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 321/1968, 267f; 2003a, 
36/2010, 7). This is why Merleau-Ponty identifies time as the very model of insti-
tution and of chiasm (2003a, 36/2010, 7; 1964, 321/1968, 267), and calls nature 
the “Memory of the world” (1995, 163/2003b, 120; 1964, 247/1968, 194). On 
the one hand, this leads Merleau-Ponty to reject any time “in itself” that would 
be entirely purified of any point of view, since we cannot think time apart from 
our own emergence within it and our subsequent reconstruction of it. On the 
other hand, it entails no reduction of time to a correlate of thought, since 
institution here is nearly the opposite of constitution: whereas “the constituted 
makes sense only for me”, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, “the instituted makes sense 
without me” (2003a, 37/2010, 8). Simply put, just as institution is nearly the 
opposite of constitution, chiasm is nearly the opposite of correlation.  
Meillassoux’s critique of the correlationist position relies on the understanding 
of geological scales of time first opened by scientists such as Hutton. But, 
interestingly, Hutton’s Unconformity does not precisely qualify as an arche-fossil 
in Meillassoux’s sense: the Silurian seas were teaming with life, and forests were 
already spreading across the continent of Laurasia by the late Devonian Period. 
A true arche-fossil must point back more than 4.1 billion years to precede the 
earliest fossil evidence of life on earth (which, of course, does not rule out life’s 
existence elsewhere in the cosmos). Meillassoux takes no account, then, of deep 
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time’s distinctive stratigraphic rhythms–cosmic, geological, evolutionary, 
prehistoric–nor the ways that these affectively involve us in differential ways. In 
fact, Meillassoux’s invocation of ancestrality, despite its reliance on a scientific 
understanding of deep time, never recognizes the intensely interruptive and dis-
orienting character of abyssal and immemorial time. He cannot do so, since his 
view sunders reality into two worlds and two times, one correlated with sub-
jectivity, and the other describable only in mathematical terms. What Meillassoux 
misses is precisely the chiasm between lived time and natural time that makes 
any genuine encounter with the immemorial possible, and this is linked to his 
failure, throughout After Finitude, to thematize the problems of world and 
materiality on which his view depends. More generally, in his single-minded effort 
to avoid the co- of correlationism, Meillasoux fails to grasp the chi, the chiastic 
intertwining that is constitutive of materiality, world, and time. 
What characterizes the experience of the deep past is precisely its unsettling, 
vertiginous character, the loss of all common markers and measures. It is our 
ability to open onto a past that was never our own possibility, never our own 
memory–an impossible and immemorial past–that makes any scientific 
investigation or mathematical representation of such a past possible. Now, it is 
only through phenomenology that we can investigate this impossible memory, a 
memory that belongs to the elements rather than to us. In short, the ancestral 
past is indeed meaningful within our lived, pre-scientific experience of time ─and, 
furthermore, the deep evolutionary, geological, and cosmic dimensions of the 
past gain their true sense only in relation to experience. 
Through this lens, we can see that the many analyses of the “anonymity” of 
the body that Merleau-Ponty develops in Phenomenology of Perception concern 
our liability to a forgotten past, here at the level of organic life. The “someone” 
within me who is the agent of my sensing body, and who is distinct from the 
personal self of my reflective consciousness, lives, he says, in a “prehistory”, the 
“past of all pasts”, which is the time of our organic rhythms, such as the beating 
of the heart (1945, 277, 293, 100/2012, 250, 265, 87). Merleau-Ponty refers to 
this cyclical time as “the time of nature with which we coexist”, an “absolute past 
of nature” incommensurate with the narrative, linear time of the personal self 
(1945, 517, 160/2012, 479, 139). One dimension of this “absolute past of 
nature” is our own biological life, our animality, insofar as this is lived as an 
anonymous and immemorial past in relation to the narrative history of our 
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personal lives. Since this past is anterior to the distinction between subject and 
object, or between human and nonhuman, anonymous sensibility cannot be a 
conscious experience; it cannot occur within personal time, the time of reflection, 
insofar as it makes such time possible. Sensibility as an organic inheritance is 
therefore the generative ground of experience, even as it remains for each of us, 
in our reflective lives, a past that has never been present6. It is due to the lateral 
kinship of this organic prehistory that other animals speak through our voices 
and gaze out through our eyes7. 
The sensibility, sedimented habits, and organic rhythms of our bodies offer 
the most proximal and constant encounter with the immemorial past –by which 
I mean an anonymous and asubjective prehistory that haunts and conditions 
every present, without this past ever having been present for me. And yet this 
organic time of the body does not exhaust the dimensions of the immemorial 
past. In sensibility, I not only reenact my own animality, but I also, through my 
participation in the elementality of things, take up at the heart of my existence 
the entire history of the universe. The phenomenological encounter with the 
vertigo of deep time, of which I catch a glimpse in the stone, is the echo within 
my body of an asubjective time of matter, of an unfathomably ancient passage 
that haunts the heart of the present. Beyond organic time, we encounter that 
dimension of our existence that resonates with the pulsation of the geological 
and the cosmic, that is, with elemental time in its broadest registers.  
As a clast of the lithosphere, of the stony planetal skeleton that undergirds 
any earthly lifeworld, each stone recalls or remembers the elemental geoma-
teriality that precedes and exceeds all worlds. Just as creation stories envision 
the emergence of the world from formless waters and earth, the raging elements 
are a recurring motif in our eco-eschatological imagination: rising waters, gla-
ciation, parched sands and storms of dust, hurricanes and earthquakes. “Some 
say the world will end in fire, some say in ice”. Whether by fire or ice, our vision 
of the end of the world is haunted by its dissolution into elemental materials and 
forces of sublime scope and scale. As Levinas notes, “the element comes to us 
from nowhere; the side it presents to us does not determine an object, remains 
entirely anonymous. It is wind, earth, sea, sky, air” (Levinas 1971, 139/1969, 
 
6 Al-Saji (2008) has fruitfully developed this interpretation of sensibility as the generative past. 
7 I develop this point further in Toadvine 2013. 
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132). The stone extracted from the elements to become part of the world remains 
nevertheless inhabited or haunted by this anonymous elementality from which 
the world is extracted and to which it must inevitably return. This is why our 
imaginations of the world’s end run up against a limit that is, finally, 
indestructible: the fact that “there is” something, that existence as such conti-
nues, perhaps independently of all subjectivity or even all life, if only in elemental 
form: fire and ice, dust and gas, atomic radiation, the stars. 
Stone holds a preeminent place among the elements precisely because of its 
peculiar temporality, its geological memory. We owe our conception of the deep 
past to this memory of stone, which Buffon in 1778 could call “the world’s 
archives”; just as we may reconstruct human history from ancient inscriptions 
and artifacts, so it is possible, he writes, to “extract ancient monuments from the 
earth’s entrails” in order to “place a certain number of milestones on the eternal 
road of time” (Buffon 1778, 1). This archival memory of stone spans all times 
and worlds, outstripping and undergirding the literary archive that serves as the 
objective memory of human cultures. Christopher Tilley (2004) demonstrates 
how Neolithic menhirs embody the traces of prehistoric perceptual worlds, even 
as the accumulated geomaterial records of our own lives pass into the far future 
in the form of nuclear waste, the stratigraphic traces of radioactive elements from 
nuclear blasts, and fossilized “plastiglomerates”8. This timeless memory of stone 
situates it both within the world and beyond it, seesawing at its edge, which 
makes it the ideal boundary marker, milestone, or tombstone. As John Sallis 
writes: 
Stone comes from a past that has never been present, a past unassimilable to the 
order of time in which things come and go in the human world; and that nonbelonging 
of stone is precisely what qualifies it to mark and hence memorialize such comings 
and going, births and deaths. As if stone were a sensible image of timelessness, the 
ideal material on which to inscribe marks capable of visibly memorializing into an 
indefinite future. (Sallis 1994, 26) 
The stone is always somehow from another world even as it subsists in this 
one, like a meteor, a fossil, or a glacial erratic, haunted by its immemorial 
passage across worlds. 
Alongside the phantasmic projection of a world in common, a world of shared 
 
8 On “plastiglomerites”, see Corcoran, Moore, and Jazvac 2014. 
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meaning that would bridge our separate islands, then, we must take into account 
the persistent geomateriality that grants existence its areal spacing and its 
temporal span. This is less a matter of common habitat than of the essential and 
constitutive lithic materiality of every living being. As Nancy writes, “A stone is 
the exteriority of singularity in what would have to be called its mineral or 
mechanical actuality. But I would no longer be a ‘human’ if I did not have this 
exteriority ‘in me’, in the form of the quasi-minerality of bone” (1996, 18/2000, 
37; cf. Nancy 1993, 100-102/1997, 60f). Our liability to this minerality is figured 
in the skeleton as symbol of death, as the endurance of our own lithic 
elementality into the rhythm of a temporality other than or exceeding that of 
lifedeath, just as the fossil offers a glimpse of the intersection of the time of life 
with the immemorial past of stone. 
The vertigo of deep time has its source in the disruption of any correlation 
between self and world, in the impersonal worldlessness of the elements. And 
here the anonymity of the elements bends around time; it is both the prehistoric, 
ancestral past and the eternity of an unimaginable future. In short, the time 
before the world is inseparable from, perhaps indistinguishable from, the time 
after the world’s dissolution. If along one dimension, we are beings-toward-
death, then along another–anonymous and asubjective–dimension, we are 
beings-toward-the-end-of-the-world, already hearkening to the eternity of 
silence that waits to swallow all that we are and know and can imagine. “World-
withdrawal and world-decay can never be undone”, Heidegger reminds us (1971, 
41); and, we might add, neither can they be deferred. The apocalyptic 
imagination that obsesses contemporary culture is not a consequence of our 
technological domination of the planet and ourselves, therefore, but is only made 
possible by the revelation within our hearts of an impossible future that outstrips 
every imagination. To truly encounter the very materiality of our own minds and 
bodies is to fall into the abyss of such elemental time, which means to rediscover 
it at the kernel of organic and personal time. But our embodied immersion in the 
Memory of the world tears us apart, scattering us across an incommensurable 
multiplicity of temporal flows and eddies. We encounter, then, an asubjective 
time, a time without a world, at the heart of lived time. This worldless prehis-
torical time, independent of any subject, is precisely the time of the elements, of 
ashes and dust. The experience of such a mythical “time before time”, as Mer-
leau-Ponty tells us, is one that “remembers an impossible past” and “anticipates 
an impossible future” (1964, 296, 163/1968, 243, 123). This impossible future 
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is surely a return to the elements, of dust to dust; in other words, it is the 
apocalypse to come9. 
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